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is
external debt incurred by Third World country, generally in quantities beyond that country's ability to repay.
Unpayable debt is a term used to describe external debt where the interest on the debt exceeds the amount that the country
Gross domestic product, thus preventing the debt ever being repaid.
Much of the current levels of debt were amassed following the 1973 oil crisis. Increases in oil prices forced many poorer nations to borrow heavily to purchase essential supplies. At the same time, OPEC funds deposited in western banks provided a ready source of funds for loans. While a proportion of borrowed funds went towards infrastrucutre and economic development, a proportion was lost to corruption and about one-fifth was spent on arms.
Historical background
Most present-day states in
Africa and the majority of Asia did not have an independent financial existence as recently as World War II. However, not all external debts of these countries were acquired after independence. As a condition of independence in 1949, Indonesia was required to assume the Netherlands colonialism government's debt, much of which had been acquired fighting pro-independence rebels the previous four years. In order to receive independence from France, Haiti's external debt was required to pay France 150 million francs.
Egypt, which had not been formally colonized, but had been effectively governed as first an Anglo-French and later British protectorate, did not have control over the lucrative Suez Canal, which links the Mediterranean Sea with the
Red Sea (and therefore the
Indian Ocean). Denied credit to build the Aswan Dam, Egypt's government moved to nationalize the canal, formally owned by a European corporation but built (at tremendous human cost) by Egyptian labor, in 1956, sparking the Suez Crisis.
In the first decades following decolonization,
first world and multilateral creditors such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund lent massively to third world governments. Money was frequently directed towards massive
infrastructure projects such as dams and
highways. Additional funds focused on an import substitution model of development, creating a capacity to replace imports from industrialized countries. Such policies emerged in a convergence of ideologies towards the concept of industrial development, shared by capitalists, communists and Third World nationalists.
Additionally, a number of
dictatorships and arguably
Neocolonialism governments imposed and/or backed by foreign powers received extensive debt-based financing to conduct civil wars or repression against their own population. In Central and South America, these policies fell under the rubric of the national security state, civil wars accumulated substantial debts in Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia. In Haiti, the father-son dictatorship of François Duvalier and
Jean-Claude Duvalier accumulated massive debts, which the United States pressured then-exiled President Jean Bertrand Aristide to recognize as a condition of his return to power in 1995. Foreign military operations, such as the invasions of East Timor by Indonesia; of Angola and
Namibia by
South Africa; and of
Iran and Kuwait by
Iraq also led to massive indebtedness.
Massive lending was followed by the threat of major
default (finance), such as that of
Mexico, in the early 1980s, precipitating what became known as a debt crisis. Faced with the possibility of losing their investments lenders proposed a variety of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) to fundamentally reorient Southern economies. Most called for the drastic reduction in public
Welfare (financial aid) spending, focusing economic output on direct export and resource extraction, providing an attractive investment climate to multinational investors, increasing the fluidity of investment flows (by replacing foreign direct investment with the opening of
stock markets) and generally enhancing the rights of foreign investors vis-a-vis national laws.
As these programs became a prerequisite of lending and other development assistance from all major multilateral creditors, and as Soviet economic assistance evaporated in the late 1980s, SAPs became the dominant economic plan for much of the world's population. Saddled with massive debts, and unable to collectively alter unfavorable terms of trade, many Third World governments were pushed from the role of legislating economic policy to negotiating it. Many of them, such as Jamaica's
Michael Manley, have argued they were even pushed into the job of managing an enforced economic transition against the wishes of their populations.
Arguments about the fairness of Third World Debt
First world critics of this point of view state that many of these debts were freely entered into by those countries' governments; it has, however, been argued that many of these governments were
dictatorships or kleptocracies, and that the people of Third World countries cannot be held responsible for the actions of those governments. These critics further question if "unpayable debt" truly exists, since governments can refinance their debt via the
IMF or
World Bank, or come to a negotiatied settlement with their creditors.
Debt relief activists claim that the debts of poor countries could easily be paid off by first world countries. For example, the Jubilee Debt Campaign argues that the
United Kingdom could pay off all of the debt owed to it for £3 per person per year for the next ten years.
Some
economists argue against this course of action on the basis that it would motivate countries to default on their debts, or to deliberately borrow more than they can afford, and that it would not prevent a recurrence of the problem. Economists often refer to this as a "moral hazard". But some critics and debt relief activists say the problem is not necessarily with borrowers, but with lenders, and thus the moral hazard is not necessarily immoral borrowing, but immoral lending.
Libertarian economists also question the fairness of a government taxing its own citizens to pay off debts owed to it. Perhaps as a result of these considerations, there is little
politics will to write off the debts of third world countries. Some independent sources are questioning the current practice of issuing fiat 'money as debt' under fractional reserve banking.
Debt relief in response to emergencies
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake
When the
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami hit, the
G7 announced a moratorium on debts of twelve affected nations and the Paris Club suspended loan payments of three more. By the time the Paris Club met in
January 2005, its 19 member-countries had pledged a total of $3.4 billion in aid to the countries affected by the tsunami.
The debt relief for tsunami-affected nations was not universal. Sri Lanka was left with a debt of more than $8 billion and an annual debt service bill of $493 million. Indonesia retained a foreign debt of more than $132 billion (PDF) and debt service payments to the World Bank amounted to $1.9 billion in 2006.
G8 Summit 2005: Aid to Africa & Debt Cancellation
The traditional meeting of G8 finance ministers before the summit took place in
London on
10 June and 11 June
2005, hosted by former
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown. On
11 June, agreement was reached to write off the entire US dollar40 billion debt owed by 18 Highly Indebted Poor Countries to the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank#Group Entities. The annual saving in debt payments amounts to just over US$1 billion.
War on Want estimates that US$45.7 billion would be required for 62 countries to meet the
Millennium Development Goals. The ministers stated that twenty more countries, with an additional US$15 billion in debt, would be eligible for
debt relief if they met targets on fighting
political corruption and continue to fulfill
structural adjustment conditionalities that eliminate impediments to private investment and calls for countries to privatize industries, liberalize their economies, eliminate subsidies, and reduce budgetary expenditures. The agreement, which required weeks of intense negotiations led by Brown, must be approved by the lending institutions to take effect.
While negotiations have essentially taken place between the G8 member states, some of which are reluctant to endorse debt cancellation and aid increases, African governments, advocacy organizations and their allies have criticised the Blair-Brown plan as inadequate and argued that the continuation of structural adjustment policies outweighs the benefits of debt cancellation, while also pointing out that only a small proportion of the Third World debt will be affected by the proposal. Structural adjustments have been criticized for years for devastating poor countries. For example, in Zambia, structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s included massive cuts to health and education budgets, the introduction of user fees for many basic health services and for primary education, and the cutting of crucial programs such as child immunization initiatives.
While applauding the deal as an important first step,
Jubilee USA has called for a much broader initiative that includes all countries that need cancellation to achieve the
Millenium Development Goals and all creditors . Jubilee USA reported that only 1 in 10 people in the developing world will benefit from the G8 deal because so many nations (both low- and middle-income) are left out of the deal.
Besides the small number of countries included in the deal and the required structural adjustment reforms, the agreement has also been criticized as being inadequate for its failure to include all creditors. While countries that qualify for the HIPC process would have their debts cancelled to the World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank, Asian and Latin American countries will still have to pay debt service to the Asian Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. The Latin American countries that qualify for the G8 debt deal – Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua – will pay almost $1.4 billion in debt service over the next five years to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Agreement was not reached on Brown's proposed
International Finance Facility, partly because the United States said that its budget procedures meant it was unable to make the necessary long-term funding commitments.
Impact of Debt Relief
A number of impoverished countries have recently received partial or full cancellation of loans from foreign governments and international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank.
Under the
Jubilee 2000 banner, a diverse coalition of groups joined together to demand debt cancellation at the G7 meeting in Cologne,
Germany. As a result, finance ministers of the world's wealthiest nations agreed to debt relief on loans owed by qualifying countries.
A 2004 World Bank/IMF study found that in countries receiving debt relief, poverty reduction initiatives doubled between 1999 and 2004.
Tanzania used savings to eliminate school fees, hire more teachers, and build more schools.
Burkina Faso drastically reduced the cost of life-saving drugs and increased access to clean water.
Uganda more than doubled school enrollment.
In 2005,
Live 8 concerts paralleling the
G8 Summit in Scotland brought the issue of debt once again to the attention of the media and world leaders. Debt cancellation for the 18 countries qualifying under this new initiative has also brought impressive results. For example, Zambia has used savings to drastically increase its investment in health, education, and rural infrastructure.
While celebrating the successes of these individual countries, debt campaigners continue to advocate for the extension of the benefits of debt cancellation to all countries that require cancellation to meet basic human needs and as a matter of justice.
To assist in the reinvestment of released capital, most International Financial Institutions provide guidelines indicating probable shocks, programmes to reduce a country’s vulnerability through export diversification, food buffer stocks, enhanced climate prediction methods, more flexible and reliable aid disbursement mechanisms by donors, and much higher and more rapid contingency financing.
Debt as a mechanism in Economic Crisis
An example of debt playing a role in Economic Crisis was the
Argentine economic crisis. During the 1980's, Argentina, like many Latin American economies, experienced Hyperinflation. As a part of the process put in place to bring inflation under control, a Fixed exchange rate was put into place between Argentina's new currency and the US Dollar. This guaranteed that inflation would not restart, since for every new unit of currency issued by the Argentine Central Bank, the Central Bank had to hold a US Dollar against this - therefore in order to print more Argentine currency, the government required additional US Dollars. Before this currency regime was in place, if the government had needed money to finance a
Budget deficit, it could simply print more money (thus creating
Inflation); under the new system, if the government spent more than it earned through taxation in a given year, it need to cover the gap with
US Dollars, not just by printing more money. The only way the Government could get these US Dollars to finance the gap, was through higher tax of exporters' earnings or through borrowing the needed
US Dollars. Of course: a
Fixed exchange rate is incompatible a structural (i.e. recurrant) Budget deficit, as the government would need to borrow more US Dollars ever year to finance its
Budget deficit; eventually leading to an unsustainable amount of
US Dollar Debt.
Argentina's debt grew continuously during the 1990s, climbing above $120 billion USD. As a structural
Budget deficit continued, the Government kept borriwing more, Creditors continued to lend money, while the IMF suggested less state spending to stop the Government's ongoing need to keep borrowing more and more. As the Debt pile grew, it became increasingly obvious the Government's structural
Budget deficit was simply not compatible with a low inflation
Fixed exchange rate - either the government had to start earning as much as it spent, or it had to start (inflationary) printing of money (and thus abandoning the Fixed exchange rate as it would not be able to borrow the needed amounts of
US Dollars to keep the exchange rate stable). Investors started to speculate that the Government would never stop spending more than it earned, and so there was only was only one path for the government - inflation and the abandonment of the
Fixed exchange rate. In a similar fashion to
Black Wednesday, Investors began to sell the Argentine currency, betting it would become worth less against the
US Dollar when the inevitable inflation started. The became a self fulling prophesy, quickly leading to the Government's Dollar reserves to be exhausted. The crisis exploded in December 2001 riots (Argentina). In 2002, a default on about $93 billion of the debt was declared. Investment fled the country, and capital flow towards Argentina ceased almost completely.
The Argentine government met severe challenges trying to refinance the debt. Some creditors denounced the default as sheer robbery. Vulture funds who had acquired debt bonds during the crisis, at very low prices, asked to be repaid immediately. For four years, Argentina was effectively shut out of the international financial markets.
Argentina finally got a deal by which 76% of the defaulted bonds were exchanged by others, of a much lower nominal value and at longer terms. The exchange was not accepted by the rest of the private debt holders, who continue to a challenge the government to repay them a greater of percentage of the money they originally lent. The holdouts have fromed groups such as American Task Force Argentina to lobby the Argentine government, in addition to seeking redress by attempting to seize Argentine foreign reserves.
Borrowing through bond markets
Historically, developing countries sought to borrow either from other sovereign governments, institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and
banks. Since the creation of the Brady Plan, however, the issuance of bonds by developing countries, known as Emerging Market Debt has increased sharply, leading to its development as a
securities.
References
See also
External links
- Bank Information Center
- Jubilee Debt Campaign
- Jubilee USA Network
- International Debt Crisis - curriculum materials from a Latin Americanist geographer
- "The Debt Threat: How Debt is Destroying the Developing World" - Author Noreena Hertz talks to Democracy Now! on January 13, 2005.
- 'Debt relief hopes bring out the critics - BBC
- Big Picture TV * I want the earth plus 5%
- European Network on Debt and Development
is external debt incurred by
Third World country, generally in quantities beyond that country's ability to repay.
Unpayable debt is a term used to describe external debt where the interest on the debt exceeds the amount that the country Gross domestic product, thus preventing the debt ever being repaid.
Much of the current levels of debt were amassed following the 1973 oil crisis. Increases in oil prices forced many poorer nations to borrow heavily to purchase essential supplies. At the same time, OPEC funds deposited in western banks provided a ready source of funds for loans. While a proportion of borrowed funds went towards infrastrucutre and economic development, a proportion was lost to corruption and about one-fifth was spent on arms.
Historical background
Most present-day states in Africa and the majority of Asia did not have an independent financial existence as recently as
World War II. However, not all external debts of these countries were acquired after independence. As a condition of independence in 1949, Indonesia was required to assume the
Netherlands colonialism government's debt, much of which had been acquired fighting pro-independence rebels the previous four years. In order to receive independence from
France,
Haiti's external debt was required to pay France 150 million francs.
Egypt, which had not been formally colonized, but had been effectively governed as first an Anglo-French and later British
protectorate, did not have control over the lucrative Suez Canal, which links the
Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea (and therefore the Indian Ocean). Denied credit to build the Aswan Dam, Egypt's government moved to nationalize the canal, formally owned by a European corporation but built (at tremendous human cost) by Egyptian labor, in 1956, sparking the
Suez Crisis.
In the first decades following decolonization,
first world and multilateral creditors such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund lent massively to third world governments. Money was frequently directed towards massive
infrastructure projects such as
dams and
highways. Additional funds focused on an import substitution model of development, creating a capacity to replace imports from industrialized countries. Such policies emerged in a convergence of ideologies towards the concept of industrial development, shared by capitalists, communists and Third World nationalists.
Additionally, a number of dictatorships and arguably Neocolonialism governments imposed and/or backed by foreign powers received extensive debt-based financing to conduct civil wars or repression against their own population. In Central and South America, these policies fell under the rubric of the national security state, civil wars accumulated substantial debts in Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia. In
Haiti, the father-son dictatorship of François Duvalier and
Jean-Claude Duvalier accumulated massive debts, which the United States pressured then-exiled President Jean Bertrand Aristide to recognize as a condition of his return to power in 1995. Foreign military operations, such as the invasions of East Timor by
Indonesia; of
Angola and
Namibia by South Africa; and of Iran and
Kuwait by
Iraq also led to massive indebtedness.
Massive lending was followed by the threat of major
default (finance), such as that of
Mexico, in the early 1980s, precipitating what became known as a debt crisis. Faced with the possibility of losing their investments lenders proposed a variety of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) to fundamentally reorient Southern economies. Most called for the drastic reduction in public Welfare (financial aid) spending, focusing economic output on direct export and resource extraction, providing an attractive investment climate to multinational investors, increasing the fluidity of investment flows (by replacing
foreign direct investment with the opening of
stock markets) and generally enhancing the rights of foreign investors vis-a-vis national laws.
As these programs became a prerequisite of lending and other development assistance from all major multilateral creditors, and as Soviet economic assistance evaporated in the late 1980s, SAPs became the dominant economic plan for much of the world's population. Saddled with massive debts, and unable to collectively alter unfavorable terms of trade, many Third World governments were pushed from the role of legislating economic policy to negotiating it. Many of them, such as
Jamaica's Michael Manley, have argued they were even pushed into the job of managing an enforced economic transition against the wishes of their populations.
Arguments about the fairness of Third World Debt
First world critics of this point of view state that many of these debts were freely entered into by those countries' governments; it has, however, been argued that many of these governments were
dictatorships or kleptocracies, and that the people of Third World countries cannot be held responsible for the actions of those governments. These critics further question if "unpayable debt" truly exists, since governments can refinance their debt via the
IMF or World Bank, or come to a negotiatied settlement with their creditors.
Debt relief activists claim that the debts of poor countries could easily be paid off by first world countries. For example, the
Jubilee Debt Campaign argues that the United Kingdom could pay off all of the debt owed to it for £3 per person per year for the next ten years.
Some
economists argue against this course of action on the basis that it would motivate countries to default on their debts, or to deliberately borrow more than they can afford, and that it would not prevent a recurrence of the problem. Economists often refer to this as a "moral hazard". But some critics and debt relief activists say the problem is not necessarily with borrowers, but with lenders, and thus the moral hazard is not necessarily immoral borrowing, but immoral lending.
Libertarian economists also question the fairness of a government taxing its own citizens to pay off debts owed to it. Perhaps as a result of these considerations, there is little politics will to write off the debts of third world countries. Some independent sources are questioning the current practice of issuing fiat 'money as debt' under fractional reserve banking.
Debt relief in response to emergencies
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake
When the
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami hit, the
G7 announced a moratorium on debts of twelve affected nations and the
Paris Club suspended loan payments of three more. By the time the Paris Club met in January 2005, its 19 member-countries had pledged a total of $3.4 billion in aid to the countries affected by the tsunami.
The debt relief for tsunami-affected nations was not universal. Sri Lanka was left with a debt of more than $8 billion and an annual debt service bill of $493 million. Indonesia retained a foreign debt of more than $132 billion (PDF) and debt service payments to the World Bank amounted to $1.9 billion in 2006.
G8 Summit 2005: Aid to Africa & Debt Cancellation
The traditional meeting of G8 finance ministers before the summit took place in
London on 10 June and
11 June 2005, hosted by former
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown. On 11 June, agreement was reached to write off the entire US dollar40 billion debt owed by 18
Highly Indebted Poor Countries to the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the
African Development Bank#Group Entities. The annual saving in debt payments amounts to just over US$1 billion.
War on Want estimates that US$45.7 billion would be required for 62 countries to meet the
Millennium Development Goals. The ministers stated that twenty more countries, with an additional US$15 billion in debt, would be eligible for debt relief if they met targets on fighting political corruption and continue to fulfill
structural adjustment conditionalities that eliminate impediments to
private investment and calls for countries to privatize industries, liberalize their economies, eliminate subsidies, and reduce budgetary expenditures. The agreement, which required weeks of intense negotiations led by Brown, must be approved by the lending institutions to take effect.
While negotiations have essentially taken place between the G8 member states, some of which are reluctant to endorse debt cancellation and aid increases, African governments, advocacy organizations and their allies have criticised the Blair-Brown plan as inadequate and argued that the continuation of
structural adjustment policies outweighs the benefits of debt cancellation, while also pointing out that only a small proportion of the Third World debt will be affected by the proposal. Structural adjustments have been criticized for years for devastating poor countries. For example, in Zambia, structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s included massive cuts to health and education budgets, the introduction of user fees for many basic health services and for primary education, and the cutting of crucial programs such as child immunization initiatives.
While applauding the deal as an important first step,
Jubilee USA has called for a much broader initiative that includes all countries that need cancellation to achieve the
Millenium Development Goals and all creditors . Jubilee USA reported that only 1 in 10 people in the developing world will benefit from the G8 deal because so many nations (both low- and middle-income) are left out of the deal.
Besides the small number of countries included in the deal and the required structural adjustment reforms, the agreement has also been criticized as being inadequate for its failure to include all creditors. While countries that qualify for the HIPC process would have their debts cancelled to the World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank, Asian and Latin American countries will still have to pay debt service to the Asian Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. The Latin American countries that qualify for the G8 debt deal – Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua – will pay almost $1.4 billion in debt service over the next five years to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Agreement was not reached on Brown's proposed International Finance Facility, partly because the United States said that its budget procedures meant it was unable to make the necessary long-term funding commitments.
Impact of Debt Relief
A number of impoverished countries have recently received partial or full cancellation of loans from foreign governments and international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank.
Under the
Jubilee 2000 banner, a diverse coalition of groups joined together to demand debt cancellation at the G7 meeting in Cologne, Germany. As a result, finance ministers of the world's wealthiest nations agreed to debt relief on loans owed by qualifying countries.
A 2004 World Bank/IMF study found that in countries receiving debt relief, poverty reduction initiatives doubled between 1999 and 2004. Tanzania used savings to eliminate school fees, hire more teachers, and build more schools.
Burkina Faso drastically reduced the cost of life-saving drugs and increased access to clean water.
Uganda more than doubled school enrollment.
In 2005, Live 8 concerts paralleling the
G8 Summit in Scotland brought the issue of debt once again to the attention of the media and world leaders. Debt cancellation for the 18 countries qualifying under this new initiative has also brought impressive results. For example, Zambia has used savings to drastically increase its investment in health, education, and rural infrastructure.
While celebrating the successes of these individual countries, debt campaigners continue to advocate for the extension of the benefits of debt cancellation to all countries that require cancellation to meet basic human needs and as a matter of justice.
To assist in the reinvestment of released capital, most
International Financial Institutions provide guidelines indicating probable shocks, programmes to reduce a country’s vulnerability through export diversification, food buffer stocks, enhanced climate prediction methods, more flexible and reliable aid disbursement mechanisms by donors, and much higher and more rapid contingency financing.
Debt as a mechanism in Economic Crisis
An example of debt playing a role in Economic Crisis was the Argentine economic crisis. During the 1980's, Argentina, like many Latin American economies, experienced Hyperinflation. As a part of the process put in place to bring inflation under control, a
Fixed exchange rate was put into place between
Argentina's new currency and the
US Dollar. This guaranteed that inflation would not restart, since for every new unit of currency issued by the Argentine Central Bank, the Central Bank had to hold a US Dollar against this - therefore in order to print more Argentine currency, the government required additional US Dollars. Before this currency regime was in place, if the government had needed money to finance a
Budget deficit, it could simply print more money (thus creating
Inflation); under the new system, if the government spent more than it earned through taxation in a given year, it need to cover the gap with
US Dollars, not just by printing more money. The only way the Government could get these US Dollars to finance the gap, was through higher tax of exporters' earnings or through borrowing the needed
US Dollars. Of course: a
Fixed exchange rate is incompatible a structural (i.e. recurrant)
Budget deficit, as the government would need to borrow more US Dollars ever year to finance its
Budget deficit; eventually leading to an unsustainable amount of US Dollar Debt.
Argentina's debt grew continuously during the 1990s, climbing above $120 billion USD. As a structural Budget deficit continued, the Government kept borriwing more, Creditors continued to lend money, while the IMF suggested less state spending to stop the Government's ongoing need to keep borrowing more and more. As the Debt pile grew, it became increasingly obvious the Government's structural Budget deficit was simply not compatible with a low inflation Fixed exchange rate - either the government had to start earning as much as it spent, or it had to start (inflationary) printing of money (and thus abandoning the Fixed exchange rate as it would not be able to borrow the needed amounts of
US Dollars to keep the exchange rate stable). Investors started to speculate that the Government would never stop spending more than it earned, and so there was only was only one path for the government - inflation and the abandonment of the Fixed exchange rate. In a similar fashion to
Black Wednesday, Investors began to sell the Argentine currency, betting it would become worth less against the US Dollar when the inevitable inflation started. The became a self fulling prophesy, quickly leading to the Government's Dollar reserves to be exhausted. The crisis exploded in
December 2001 riots (Argentina). In 2002, a default on about $93 billion of the debt was declared. Investment fled the country, and capital flow towards Argentina ceased almost completely.
The Argentine government met severe challenges trying to refinance the debt. Some creditors denounced the default as sheer robbery. Vulture funds who had acquired debt bonds during the crisis, at very low prices, asked to be repaid immediately. For four years, Argentina was effectively shut out of the international financial markets.
Argentina finally got a deal by which 76% of the defaulted bonds were exchanged by others, of a much lower nominal value and at longer terms. The exchange was not accepted by the rest of the private debt holders, who continue to a challenge the government to repay them a greater of percentage of the money they originally lent. The holdouts have fromed groups such as American Task Force Argentina to lobby the Argentine government, in addition to seeking redress by attempting to seize Argentine foreign reserves.
Borrowing through bond markets
Historically, developing countries sought to borrow either from other sovereign governments, institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and banks. Since the creation of the Brady Plan, however, the issuance of bonds by developing countries, known as
Emerging Market Debt has increased sharply, leading to its development as a
securities.
References
See also
External links
- Bank Information Center
- Jubilee Debt Campaign
- Jubilee USA Network
- International Debt Crisis - curriculum materials from a Latin Americanist geographer
- "The Debt Threat: How Debt is Destroying the Developing World" - Author Noreena Hertz talks to Democracy Now! on January 13, 2005.
- 'Debt relief hopes bring out the critics - BBC
- Big Picture TV * I want the earth plus 5%
- European Network on Debt and Development